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tionate or mentally cruel when the convict's alternative is a prison
sentence.
Concluding that banishment by a state court is not a cruel and un-
usual punishment does not validate such a punishment and permit a
judge to grant a suspended sentence conditioned on the convicted
criminal's leaving the state. The objections to such a procedure based
on public policy and the judicial usurpation of executive power, are
still valid and would be sufficient to strike such a sentence, in which
instance, the case would be remanded for proper sentencing.
42
In summary, a condition of banishment is a permissible requisite
to a conditional pardon, but void when rendered as a condition to a
suspended sentence. Although recent cases indicate an acceptance of
the premise that banishment from the United States amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment, it is submitted that this is not applicable
when the banishment is merely from a state, county, or city. Both the
Mansell and Bird line of cases remain good authority for their respec-
tive propositions and neither should be altered by evolutionary de-
velopments of the eighth amendment provision against cruel and
unusual punishment.
JAMEs A. GoP.RY, III
RIL VS. THE EXPERT WITNESS IN MALPRACTICE CASES
"In few other human relationships between adult competent
persons is one person apt to be so dependent on another and so
unaware of the significance of the acts and performance of the
other, as is the patient in many physician-patient, particularly
surgeon-patient, relationships."'
The above statement offers an accurate appraisal of a unique
interrelationship between two individuals which results from a pa-
tient's willingness to repose complete trust and confidence in his doc-
tor. Because of the high standards of competence generally required by
the medical profession of its members this trust is usually not mis-
"2Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1962); People v.
Cortez, 19 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Ex parte Scarborough, 76 Cal.
App. 2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946); People v. Lopez, Si Cal. App. 199,
253 Pac 169 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); People v. Baum, 251 Mich 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930);
Hoggett v. State, loi Miss. 269, 57 So. 811 (1912); Ex parte Sheehan, oo Mont.
244, 49 P.2d 438 (1935); State v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 368, 74 S.E.2d 922 (1953); State
v. Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E. 501. (1900).
'Louisell and Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases 14.o4, at 425-26
(196o).
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placed, and the ultimate outcome of treatment will be a result satis-
factory to all concerned. Unfortunate instances do occur, however,
which terminate in unforeseen injury or even death to a patient dur-
ing the course of treatment. When these consequences stem from
agencies beyond the control or anticipation of the doctor, they must
be accepted as part of the risk inherent in any medical procedure. Com-
plex legal problems arise, however, when the patient has good reason
to believe that his injury was needlessly brought about by careless-
ness or negligence on the part of the doctor.
The recent case of Brown v. Keaveny2 from the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia absolved an oral surgeon of a malpractice
charge which grew out of the extraction of an impacted molar. Re-
moval of the tooth required chipping at the jawbone with a hammer
and chisel while the patient was under a general anesthetic. In the
process of removal the patient's jawbone was fractured. The plaintiff
offered no expert testimony to establish the defendant's negligence,
but relied instead on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court held
RIL to be inapplicable, saying that this was not an injury which lay-
men can say, based on their common knowledge, usually does not oc-
cur unless there is negligence, and so expert testimony would be neces-
sary on this point. The per curiam opinion of Judges Washington,
Danaher, and Wright states that expert testimony is always essential
when the question turns on the "merits and the performance of sci-
entific treatment."3 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wright contended
that the workings of a hammer and chisel do not need to be ex-
plained by medical experts, and that with the advent of medical lia-
bility insurance, courts should be more liberal in allowing a plain-
tiff to go to the jury, since the physician no longer needs an almost
absolute immunity from financial liability.
Since a physician is a specialist and deemed to possess special
skills and knowledge, ordinarily the expert testimony of his colleagues
is necessary in order to establish any negligence on his part.4 This often
proves to be the greatest stumbling block confronting a plaintiff who
seeks recovery in a malpractice action, as there is a marked disinclina-
tion on the part of members of the medical profession to testify against
a fellow practitioner. This is often termed the "conspiracy of silence" 5
2326 F.2d 66o (D.C. Cir. 1963).
31d. at 661.
'Morgan v. Rosenberg, 370 S.W.2d 685 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1963); Nelson v.
Murphy, 42 Wash. 2d 737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953).
See Note, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1o9 (1961).
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and has been recognized both by legal writers6 and by the courts.1 In an
effort to somewhat lighten this burden cast on the plaintiff and to
save him from an automatic nonsuit, courts in recent years have
shown an increasing willingness to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur in certain types of malpractice cases.8 RIL means simply that "the
things speaks for itself," and the general view seems to be that it is
a form of circumstantial evidence which will create an inference of
negligence to allow the plaintiff to escape a nonsuit and get to the
jury.9 The conditions requisite for the application of RIL have been
generally acknowledged to be:
(i) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence;
(2) the apparent cause of the accident is such that the defendant
would be responsible for any negligence connected with it; and
(3) the possibility of contributing conduct by the plaintiff which
would make him responsible is eliminated.1 0 The fact that the evi-
dence is more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plain-
tiff is not an indispensable criterion, but it may influence courts to
apply the doctrine in certain cases."
RIL is applied in a malpractice case when the jury can say from
common knowledge that plaintiff's injury would not ordinarily have
TProsser, Torts § 42, at 2io (2d ed. 1955); Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Ap-
plied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 Vili. L. Rev. 250 (1956); Note, 45 Minn.
L. Rev. 1oi9 (ig6i).
7Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal.
App. 2d 746, 343 P.-d 118 (1959); Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956), in
which the court said that the "notorious unwillingness of members of the medical
profession to testify against one another may impose an insuperable handicap upon
a plaintiff who cannot obtain professional proof." Id. at 779. The "conspiracy of
silence" has been carried to the extreme of a local medical association's bringing
disciplinary action against a physician who testified adversely to a colleague in a
malpractice action. See Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa County Medical Ass'n,
139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (1956). See generally the exhaustive coverage of
the "conspiracy of silence" problem in Note 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1o9 (1961).
""The principal factors motivating the increasing acceptance of the doctrine
[IL] in malpractice cases, in addition to the general feeling of unfairness caused
by inability of plaintiffs to get medical testimony, have been the constantly develop-
ing lay comprehension of medical techniques and practice, the growing judicial
awareness that the progress of medical science is a substance withheld from the
victims of malpractice by the profession's self-imposed rule of silence about acts
of malpractice, and the inclination to reaffirm the common law's hard-headed
distrusts of expertise that runs counter to the observations of common sense."
Louisell and Williams, supra note 1, 14.02, at 421 (1960).
"Prosser, Torts § 43, at 211 (2d ed. 1955).
109 Wigmore, Evidence § 2509 (3 d ed. 194o).
2'Prosser, Torts § 42, at 209 (2d ed. 1955).
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happened in the absence of negligence (or can draw an inference to
that effect from testimony offered at the trial),12 and its effect is to
obviate the necessity for expert testimony. The situations with which
courts are confronted fall into three categories:
(i) Those injuries on which a layman is obviously competent to
pass judgment, such as when a sponge is left in the patient's interior,
13
the removal or injury of a part of the patient's body not involved in
the operation,14 nerve damage caused by an ordinary injection, 15 seri-
ous burns from a hot water bottle,'6 or a fracture so poorly set as to be
apparent to a layman;'7
(2) Those injuries on which a layman is obviously not competent
to pass judgment, such as those involving a mistake in diagnosis, un-
successful treatment or mere adverse result of medical procedure,
choice of a wrong method of treatment, or an adverse result of medi-
cal procedure which is known to produce some bad effects even when
all reasonable precautions have been taken (the so-called "calculated
risks");' 8
(3) Those injuries which fall into the "gray area" between these two
extremes. In these cases, it might be said that the layman can under-
stand the mechanics of the procedures employed by the doctor, but
2 Quick v. Thurston, 290 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d
503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953); Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894
(1955); Hidgon v. Carlebach 348 Mich. 363, 83 N.V.2d 296 (1957); Klein v. Arnold,
203 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 196o). So if RIL is applied in a malpractice suit, the
fact of the injury alone may be evidence of negligence when the jury can say that
such an injury ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence. See Tray-
nor's dissent in Cavero v. Franklin General Benevolent Soc'y, 36 Cal. 2d 301, 223
P.2d 471 (1950).
"Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936); Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.
App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 74o (1935); Funk v. Bonham, 20o4 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932);
Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941).
1 4Oldis v. La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutulle, i3o Cal. App. 2d 461,
279 P.2d 184 (1955); Ybarra v. Spangard, 13 Cal. App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949);
Morrison v. Lane, io Cal. App. 2d 634, 52 P.2d 530 (1935); Brown v. Shortlidge,
98 Cal. App. 352, 277 Pac. 134 (1929); Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy
and Surgery, 79 N.W.2d 3o6 (Iowa, 1956).
u Bauer v. Otis, 133 Cal. App. 2d 439, 284 P. 2d 133 (1955).
1 1Timbrell v. Suburban Hospital, 4 Cal. 2d 68, 47 P.2d 737 (1935); Meyer v.
McNutt Hospital, 173 Cal. 156, 159 Pac. 436 (1916); Vonault v. O'Rouke, 97 Mont.
92, 33 P.2d 535 (1934).
"7Olsen v. Weitz, 37 Wash. 2d 20, 221 P.2d 535 (1950).
'5 Louisell and Williams, supra note i, at 14.o6, at 337-38 (196o). These four
areas should be distinguished from the case in which during the performance of a
surgical or other skilled operation an ultimate act or omission takes place which
does not require scientific opinion to prove lack of due care. See Rodgers v. Lawson,
17o F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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possibly would not be aware of their effects and consequences in a
medical context.
The Keaveny case falls into this last area, for while the jury could
understand how a hammer and chisel "works" and the purpose for
employing this procedure, it is possible that the operation involved
other risks and complications beyond the grasp of the lay mind.
Most of the difficulties in applying RIL in malpractice cases arise
in the gray area. The decision as to whether the jury is competent to
pass on a particular injury is for the trial judge who is a layman
himself with no objective standard upon which to base his ruling.
The result has been a sharp conflict among jurisdictions, anomalous
holdings, and a complete lack of uniformity in the law.19 It is sub-
mitted that a more equitable result would be reached with greater
consistency if RIL were applied to all gray area cases where the pa-
tient is unconscious.
The question which immediately arises, of course, is whether this
would be too great a burden to impose upon doctors, and in this con-
text it may be helpful to examine the procedural effect such a change
would bring about. Res ipsa loquitur means simply that the facts of the
occurrence warrant an inference of negligence, and not that they com-
pel such an inference. 20 For this reason, the majority of the courts
have held that the burden of proof does not shift to the defendant
when the doctrine is applied,21 although strong arguments have been
made to the effect that this would not be an unfair result in malprac-
"Compare with Keaveny the case of Eichholtz v. Poe, 217 S.W. 282 (Mo. 1920),
which held that a broken jaw usually does not result from the extraction of a
tooth in the absence of negligence, stressing the complete control of the defen-
dant over this particular operation. The defendant broke a patient's jaw while
removing an impacted tooth in Francis v. Brooks, 24 Ohio App. 705, 156 N.E. 609
(1926), but there RIL was not requested by the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court
held that no expert witnesses were required. Some cases, notably Hayes v. Brown,
io8 Ga. App. 360, 133 S.E.2d 102 (1963), and Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation, 226
Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1o9o (1961), have held that RIL is never applicable in a mal-
practice suit, while others have imputed rather extraordinary knowledge to a
layman; for instance, Hurt v. Susnow, 192 P.2d 771 (Cal. App. 1948) held that it
was common knowledge among laymen that burns from silver nitrate ordinarily do
not occur in the absence of negligence; Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342,
2 Cal. Rptr. 162 (196o), said it was common knowledge that facial nerves usually are
not injured during the course of a mastiodectomy; Klein v. Arnold, 2o3 N.Y.S.2d
797 (Sup. Ct. 196o), held that a rupture which occurs while a patient is undergoing
an esophogoscopy to determine whether or not a stricture was malignant is evi-
dence of negligence without any necessity for expert testimony.
mSweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913).
2iProsser, Torts § 43, at 211 (2d ed. 1955).
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tice cases.2 2 To allow the plaintiff to go to the jury, the inference raised
need not be compelling in favor of defendant's negligence, 23 nor is
it necessary to exclude every possibility of external negligence and
non-negligence causation. 24 All the defendant has to do to rebut the




The increasing judicial acceptance of RIL in malpractice has been
particularly manifest when the patient was unconscious. 26 In Ybarra
v. Spangard27 the court pointed out that the doctrine, which had its
inception in common sense and logic, has been judicially developed
into a rigid and inflexible rule which precludes application where it is
most important that it be applied, since a patient otherwise is unable
to recover unless the doctor volunteers damning information, a most
unlikely possibility.2 In this situation the duty of a physician toward
his patient, created by the special and unique relationship existing
between them, becomes quite apparent.29 In other fields, notably that
of the common carrier, the law has recognized that such a duty carries
nLouisell and Williams, supra note 1, at 15.05, at 474 (1960).
nChenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 1o6, 43 S.E. 443 (19o3).
-4Ales v. Ryan, supra note 13.
'Hinds v. Wheadon, 67 Cal. App. 2d 456, 154 P.2d 720 (1945); Prosser, Torts
§43, at 215 (2d ed. 1955).
'In Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384, 166 S.E. 285, 289 (1932), the court,
quoting from Herzog's Medical Jurisprudence, said: "In many other cases, it has
been held that mere proof of a mistake or poor results does not itself prove mal-
practice, but where the injury is received while the patient is unconscious, the
doctrine [RIL] commonly is held to apply because under such circumstances
the patient would not be able to testify as to what had happened, whereas the
physician would."
Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947), has carried
this idea one step further. It was established at the trial that there were four pos-
sible causes for an explosion which caused plaintiff's injury, two of which involved
no negligence on the part of defendant. The court held RIL applicable saying that
since the doctor was in a position to produce substantial evidence on the question
of negligence and failed to do so, there is a presumption that the evidence would
be adverse to him. See also: Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955);
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal.
App. 2d 342, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167 (196o); Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteo-
pathy and Surgery, supra note 14; Whetsteine v. Moravec, 228 Iowa 352, 291 N.W.
425 (1943); and Cavero v. Franklin General Benevolent Soc'y, supra note 12; in
which the court noted that an unusual event, while the patient is under an anes-
thetic, puts the burden on the doctor and the hospital.
"1-5 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.ad 687 ('944).
-See also Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.ad 915 (1955).
"'See Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Ybarra v. Spangard,
25 Cal. ad 486, 154 P.-d 687 (1944); Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 342, 2 Cal. Rptr.
167 (196o).
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with it a greater burden of explanation when an accident occurs.3 0 It
would seem only logical that the unconscious patient on an operating
table should be entitled to a reasonable explanation of his injury as
is the fully conscious commuter on a city bus. It is often said that
a physician is no better able to explain the "mysteries of life" than
the man on the street, but the application of RIL would not require
him to do so, any more than it requires the carrier to explain why
a mechanical failure occurred when he can show that he was free from
fault.
The existence of the "conspiracy of silence" presents probably the
most compelling reason for allowing a plaintiff the latitude of RIL
in these gray area cases. It has been said that if the plaintiff is not
given this procedural advantage, not only will many guilty parties
escape punishment, but their fellow practitioners will take no steps
to insure that this same result will not be repeated.3 1
Malpractice cases are among those in which the application of the
equitable notion of "balancing the hardships" would certainly seem
to be warranted, in fact, almost necessary. However, these are the very
cases in which many courts, seemingly loath to extend any concept
unless a "perfect" solution can be found, refuse to do this, constru-
ing the law most strictly against the plaintiff. Of course, strict liabili-
ty for physicians is out of the question and it is not contended that a
doctor should ever be an insurer of health. At the other extreme,
though, there is a kind of reverse "strict liability" applied against
the plaintiff who is unable to obtain expert testimony. Even if his
claim is meritorious the plaintiff is helpless because his only chance
of recovery, ironically enough, lies with the person from whom he is
seeking to recover and his colleagues. It is submitted that RIL is a
good balance between strict liability for physicians on one hand and
strict nonsuit for plaintiffs on the other.
The proposition that a plaintiff should not be allowed to rest
his case on the jury's "untutored sympathies" is certainly a valid one,32
but it cannot be assumed that a jury will neglect its duty and ignore
all other considerations merely because a plaintiff in a tort action
will undoubtedly appeal to its sympathies. The whole theory behind
having the doctor explain his conduct is to tutor these sympathies
and give both parties the fairest treatment possible under the circum-
stances. Cases have shown that while getting an expert witness for a
'Prosser, Torts § 42, at 207 (2d ed. 1955).
3Salgo v. Trustees of Stanford University, 154 Cal. App. 2d 56o, 317 P.2d 170
(1957).
2Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 66o (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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plaintiff may be a virtually impossible task, the defendant doctor
fares considerably better.33 Thus, the burden placed on him to over-
come an RIL case does not seem to be too great. He must merely
give a reasonable explanation of what happened, and with his own
standing as an expert and the help of his fellow physicians, this should
not prove an unfair or insurmountable task if he is in fact free from
fault.34 If it is clear that a jury verdict for the plaintiff was based
merely on sympathy, the judge can then set it aside as contrary to the
weight of the evidence. 35
It is contended, then, that in gray area malpractice cases where the
patient is unconscious the court should apply the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in an effort to persuade the doctor to explain his conduct.
Not only would the doctrine give the plaintiff his day in court without
predicating his right of recovery on the whim of his opponent, but it
would be instrumental in persuading the medical profession (and
possibly the insurance companies) 36 to take a more responsible posi-
tion with regard to malpractice litigation and make an effort to aid in
the solution of the problem. Finally, it would diminish the chances of
incompetence being perpetuated behind the wall of almost absolute
protection which now surrounds the physician. A California court has
succinctly stated the problem and the policy behind its solution:
"In an integrated society where individuals become inevitably
dependent upon others for the exercise of due care, where these
relationships are all closely interwoven with our daily living,
the requirement for explanation is not too great a burden to
impose upon those who wield the instruments of injury and
whose due care is vital to life itself."
37
FRANK EUGENE BROWN, JR.
-See Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P.2d (1947), where
the defendant had at least one expert witness and the plaintiff none; Cho v.
Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167 (196o), where there were three
expert witnesses who testified for the defendant and none for the plaintiff; Toy
v. Mackintosh, 222 Mass. 430, 11o N.E. 1034 (1916), where defendant had four
experts and plaintiff none.
2'See Klein v. Arnold, 2.3 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 196o), as an example of a
case where defendant's testimony itself overcame plaintiff's RIL case.
tOn the other hand, it is fairly well settled that the criteria for directing a
verdict and the criteria for setting one aside as contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence are entirely different, and the judge should not direct a verdict merely
because he thinks he would have to set aside a contrary one. See: McDonald v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 167 N.Y. 66, 6o N.E. 282 (19Ol).
-In Belli, supra note 6, the author expresses the opinion that insurance com-
panies are responsible for much of the "conspiracy of silence" as they exert pressure
to dissuade physicians from testifying on behalf of a plaintiff in a malpractice
action.
nCho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (i96o).
